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Abstract 
The paper revisits participation and decentralization in relation to local clientelism, arguing 
that they share the personalization of links between residents and the State and the local 
possibility to adapt state policies. The line between decentralization-participation on the one 
hand, and clientelism on the other, is therefore easily blurred. The paper thus argues that 
clientelism is not per se anti-democratic, some forms allow for local and immediate 
accountability of politicians. However, in most cases, it contributes to fragment or sedate 
local organizations or social movements and it prevents contestation of existing policies and 
dominant power structures. The paper thus challenges the idea that the promotion of 
decentralization and participatory institutions intrinsically leads to more democratic forms of 
government. 
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Two stories on clientelism and accountability 
The two stories that follow take place in a low-income inner city neighbourhood of 
Johannesburg divided into two electoral wards, both marked by significant electoral 
competition, an exceptional occurrence in Johannesburg prior to the 2008 elections, where 
the African National Congress (ANC) had a strong majority in most wards. This competition 
had led, in both wards, to the victory of opposition parties in the 2006 municipal elections: 
one led by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the other by the Democratic Alliance (DA). 
While this makes the stories specific, perhaps rendering more visible issues of accountability 
and clientelism, they are far from exceptional in low-income areas of post-apartheid 
Johannesburg. Here, we use these stories as emblematic of local political dynamics,
2
 as a 
means to query assumptions made about the relationship between practices of local 
democracy and clientelism. 
 
Story One 
In this low-income inner-city neighbourhood, the municipal administration wanted to 
distribute food parcels to the poor – only a limited number were to benefit as resources were 
scarce. In the name of ‘proximity’ to the ground and a better knowledge of needy households 
(of which there were many in the area), the City asked SANCO (South African National 
Civic Organisation, a major residents’ organization in the area3) to choose the beneficiaries 
and organise their distribution. 
 
It seems that SANCO distributed the parcels to its own members, no less needy than 
non-members: in a context where poverty is rife and public goods scarce, what legitimate 
criteria can distinguish those in need, especially for such insignificant public goods?
4
 
However small these advantages are, they play an important role in residents’ everyday 
hopes, expectations, and tactics. These types of advantages can explain the civic’s sustained 
popularity in the neighbourhood, in spite of many rumours about some level of dishonest 
practices. One of these, reported by several residents and local leaders, mentions in particular 
the collection of fees from members in exchange for a promise of access to public housing.
5
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Another, more ambiguous in its effect, reports that SANCO, generally known for defending 
tenants on the verge of being evicted by their landlords, is sometimes one of the evictors, and 
uses the houses it has taken over, or ‘hijacked’, to accommodate its own members. 
 
Story Two 
In the same neighbourhood, another group of residents (about a hundred people living in a 
quite distinct cluster of council houses next to a stadium, and calling themselves ‘the 
seventeen houses’), managed to negotiate with ‘the State’ to avoid eviction in the context of 
the 2010 World Cup. These residents had important political resources, as many were long-
standing ANC anti-apartheid activists, and therefore maintained dense political networks 
within both the party and the state. Already, in 1995 in preparation for the Rugby World Cup, 
the City tried to demolish the seventeen houses, which were in fact an ‘oddity’ in a precinct 
devoted to international sporting facilities. Residents had retorted, successfully, ‘How can 
you betray us, just after we’ve put you in power?’ However, in the preparation for the 2010 
Soccer World Cup, once again, the municipality intended to remove this cluster of houses in 
order to build a shopping mall to encourage international visitors to spend money during the 
one-month mega-event. In 2009, the residents’ committee contacted a non-government 
organization (NGO), the Center for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), well-known for its 
successful lawsuits against the City of Johannesburg. After a few months of joint action - 
during which CALS had sent letters to the City requesting information regarding the fate of 
its ‘clients’ and threatening to sue in case of non-response, the residents’ committee suddenly 
changed tactics and attacked CALS, accusing the NGO of being ‘racist’, ‘anti-ANC’, 
betraying the nation as ‘trying to undermine the foundation’ of the post-apartheid democratic 
state, ‘promoting a culture of non payment’ and orderlessness. It seems likely that the 
residents’ committee negotiated with the City of Johannesburg, through their linkages to high 
ranking ANC party or City officials, with the trade-off: the City would abandon the eviction
6
 
and residents would drop the lawsuit and terminate their relationship with CALS.  
 
What do these two stories tell us about a poor neighbourhood’s access to the state in post-
apartheid Johannesburg? They certainly point to the messy character of local democracy, and 
the often odd ways in which participation, decentralization, and clientelism interact. 
Participation is understood here as the modalities and extent to which residents have a say 
(through ‘invited’ or ‘invented’ spaces of participation (Miraftab 2004); through elected but 
also non-elected local representatives (such as the residents’ committee, civic association, or 
NGOs), in their direct environment or in the local allocation of public resources. 
Decentralization is meant here as the transfer of power and responsibilities at a local level, 
based on the belief that knowledge is embedded ‘on the ground’ and that the local scale is 
more responsive to specific needs.
7
 And clientelism can be provisionally defined as the 
granting (by politicians to voters) of public goods based on personal networks and influences 
rather than on a well-established and clear set of principles and rights. The objective of this 
paper is to unravel this messiness, and confront and compare the theoretical tenets of each of 
these blurred concepts (participation, decentralization, clientelism) that are mostly addressed 
in distinct and separate literature and disciplines. I will start with a reflection on the 
theoretical disjuncture that operates in most literature between local democracy on the one 
hand, and clientelism on the other. A second part of the paper will explore the theoretical and 
practical similarities between the two notions; finally I will consider the consequences of this 
similarity for local democratic accountability for low-income residents in Johannesburg. 
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Local democracy and clientelism: a theoretical or disciplinary disjuncture? 
The local level is often perceived as more democratic than other scales of government, as it 
offers citizens the possibility of directly liaising with elected representatives, and therefore 
holding them to account, especially on local issues that affect their daily lives. Purcell (2006) 
has warned about the danger of worshipping the local scale, arguing it holds nothing 
inherently more democratic than others. However the local scale is certainly specific in the 
potential it offers for interpersonal contacts between residents and their representatives, for a 
more ‘humane’, flexible and locally-grounded State. In addition the local scale offers the 
potential for policy makers to grapple with the challenges of implementing their policies, and 
also with the effects of these policies on their direct constituencies (John 2009). This 
potential for greater State accountability has been one of the key driving forces for 
decentralization as well as local participation in recent decades, all around the world; the 
other driving force being, especially in African societies, the globally-driven, neoliberal 
attempt to weaken or side-line the central State considered corrupt and inefficient. In African 
cities, this plea for both a greater decentralization and an enhanced participation of civil 
society in urban governance has been reinforced by the understanding that central states do 
not control many of the urban dynamics currently shaping African cities (Swilling, 1997). 
Local democracy therefore is seen as the way to build democracy and achieve efficient urban 
governance. 
 
Often the local scale is assumed to be more democratic due to an increased level of 
accountability of office bearers thanks to personal, direct and ordinary contacts with the 
voters. One cannot but be struck by the possible clientelist nature of such links, however, 
which precisely rely on personal, binding relationships between elected representatives and 
their voters. Whereas many South American scholars have argued that the development of 
local democracy (understood here in its two dimensions of decentralization and participation) 
is a way out of what they conceive as ‘traditional clientelism’, or patronage (Abers 1998; 
Gay 1998), this paper argues the contrary: local democracy might well be conducive to 
clientelism as it rests on similar principles (personalisation of relationships between citizens 
and the State; flexibility and adaptability of policies to local contexts). 
 
Political clientelism has been defined in many ways (Médard 1973; Briquet and Sawicki 
1998; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) and has taken many forms depending on context, scale 
and focus, for instance patronage, prebendalism, patrimonialism, or neo-patrimonialism. 
Here we follow Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), who define it as a direct exchange between a 
politician and a voter, of public goods (given as ‘favours’) for political support (vote and 
other). This definition is specific in a number of respects. First, it is not necessarily an 
individual relationship between two agents, even though it is a ‘direct’ relationship relying on 
personalized linkages. It can develop between a politician and a group in which case we 
speak of collective clientelism. Second, political clientelism is about the distribution of public 
goods such as public housing, employment contracts, and access to social services, for 
instance. Third, political clientelism is not merely about the vote, political support takes 
many forms (as outlined by Auyero 1999); participating in party rallies, being the party 
watchdog in public or local meetings, for instance. Finally, it is a non-normative definition 
that excludes moral judgement but attempts to analyse existing dynamics and mechanisms 
linking voters and political representatives. 
 
Clientelism is almost universally described as an evil, largely responsible for the failure of 
democracy in Africa: precisely what global institution-driven principles of ‘good 
governance’ fight against (World Bank 2000; Keefer 2002; Keefer 2005), in particular (and 
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paradoxically) through decentralization and residents’ participation in urban governance 
(World Bank 1996; Brinkhoff and Goldsmith 2002). Many World Bank reports interestingly 
highlight that decentralization and governance reform might provide space for clientelism 
(Keefer 2002; Keefer 2005); but they understand clientelism as radically opposed to 
democracy. What we wish to argue here is that clientelism and local democracy are 
intertwined, in practice and, possibly more importantly, in their principles. We argue, 
therefore, that to draw normative lines between supposedly ‘good’ (democratic), and ‘bad’ 
(clientelistic) relationships between a citizen and her elected representative might be counter-
productive task.  
 
Instead, this paper considers whether there are analytical tools to understand in what 
circumstances local democracy leads to clientelism, and in which cases it does not. Or, as 
argued by a number of Latin American scholars (Gay 1999; Auyero 1996; Auyero 1999) and 
also theorists from the North (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), whether there is essentially a 
continuity between local democracy and clientelism, which relies on forms of exchange of 
votes for public deliverables, and which at times provides for accountability. The objective 
here is not only to provide a more subtle understanding of clientelism, as a de facto form of 
accountability in certain conditions
8
 – but also to highlight how, similarly to clientilism, 
decentralization and local participation can lead, if uncritically praised, to undemocratic 
practices and ultimately to the disempowerment of the poor.  
 
While several studies assess the impact of decentralization on corruption, poverty alleviation 
or development (see e.g. Bhardan and Mookherjee 2006), few reflect on the theoretical and 
practical proximity of these three notions, and unravel at the local level the complex 
mechanisms of party politics in the daily practice of urban governance (Williams 2004). Why 
is that so? Following Low (2007), local party political dynamics and their influence in urban 
governance and local democracy are seldom studied on their own (see Benit-Gbaffou, 
forthcoming). On the one hand, scholars in political studies consider party politics (which lie 
at the core of clientelism) as of little importance at local level, compared to national or 
regional level politics. On the other hand, they are often seen by other social scientists as too 
dirty and messy, driven by power-hungry individuals, perhaps appearing ‘inauthentic’ 
(whatever that may mean) compared to residents’ social movements (McAdam et al 1996; 
Ballard et al 2006), the politics of everyday resistance (Scott 1998; Bayat 1997), or 
participation (Cornwall 2008). Occasionally, the importance of party politics in low-income 
residents’ everyday lives is stressed (Simone 2004; Tostensen et al 2001), but it is seldom 
analysed and only mentioned as a possible impediment to civil society’s supposedly 
meaningful, progressive, and autonomous democratic participation. We see thus a general 
reluctance to open the ‘black box’ of petty politics that characterize residents’ (supposedly) 
progressive movements, or a lack of interest in the dynamics of the micro-local scale of 
urban governance. This gap has been produced in the disciplinary silos that seal our debates. 
Here, we attempt to bring these threads together to explain political and social dynamics 
observed on the ground to make two related points: first, that there is a practical, but also 
theoretical proximity between decentralization-participation and local clientelism; second, 
that the notion of accountability links in complex and unexpected ways to local democracy 
on the one hand, and clientelism on the other. 
 
The practical and theoretical proximity of decentralization-participation-clientelism 
A highly positive connotation is usually associated with the notions of decentralization and 
participation and the inter-relationship between them in direct contrast and opposition to the 
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generally negative understanding of clientelism. Both decentralization and participation have 
attracted massive intellectual and political support, both from progressive academics and 
activists, and from neo-liberal global institutions (World Bank 1996; World Bank 2000).
9
 
 
Critical approaches to decentralization and participation have remained limited. As far as 
internal contradictions of participation are concerned, they have focused mainly on the 
(necessarily) limited representativity of participatory democracy as opposed to representative 
democracy (Abers 1998). Others have denounced the capture of local democracy by local 
elites (or at least ‘the empowered’), new or old (Bardhan and Mookerjhee 2004; Veron et al. 
2006), at the expense of more marginal groups who remain voiceless in decentralized 
structures and participatory platforms (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Harriss 2002). Some have 
also argued that the restriction of public debate around local and immediate issues has proved 
an efficient way of depoliticising democratic debates, sedating social movements and 
avoiding more radical questioning of existing power structures and forces acting at broader 
levels (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mohan and Stokke 2000). Much less literature focuses, 
however, on the nature of local participation and decentralization in relationship to 
democracy, and its potential to give rise to un-democratic processes (Staniland 2008; Veron 
et al 2006). This oversight reflects an entrenched notion that ‘communities’ (especially low-
income ones) cannot be wrong or exclusionary, and thus participation is rarely understood or 
theorized as ‘conservative’. By stressing the proximity of participation and decentralization 
to clientelism, we allow for a deeper analysis of the relationship between participation-
decentralization and democracy, and for the introduction of party politics to the 
understanding of urban governance (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Williams 2004). 
 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s recent work on clientelism (2007) is useful in this regard, as they 
convincingly argue that, in the analysis of the relationship between politicians and voters (in 
particular in its dimension of accountability), there is a difference in gradient, rather than in 
nature, between what they call ‘programmatic policies’ and ‘clientelist policies’. They define 
‘programmatic policies’ as policies benefiting a certain social group, in principle, a posteriori, 
and therefore indirectly, abstractly; for example, a political programme lifting taxes on 
business will largely benefit the economic elite, a programme promoting universal medical 
aid will primarily benefit the poorest. ‘Clientelist policies’ also benefit certain social groups, 
but in a more direct way, through less abstract and more personal engagement between the 
politicians and the beneficiaries or voters and possibly a priori; for example if a politician 
provides electricity to a neighbourhood, she will expect the neighbourhood to organise voting 
support for her. Between what are considered two poles of a continuum there are a variety of 
policies that define a narrower group of beneficiaries in a relationship that is intermediate: 
not entirely abstract and indirect, not entirely personalized and direct. What is interesting in 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s model is the continuum they stress between programmatic and 
clientelist policies, on the basis that they both rely on a relationship between politicians and 
voters based on an ‘exchange of votes for benefits’, those benefits defined more as abstract 
‘rights’ in the first case, more as personal or localized ‘favours’ in the second; given on the 
basis of an abstract and legally defined rule in the first case, on the basis of a direct, locally 
defined arrangement in the second. 
 
This continuum is even more evident in African countries, where the scarcity of public 
resources, aggravated in the context of structural adjustment programmes, often leads 
governments to pragmatically transform a programmatic policy (for instance, employment of 
local residents in local development projects) into a clientelist policy (Khan 2005). This is 
clearly illustrated in Story One above. What might be considered a fair criterion and selection 
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process for beneficiaries of food parcels, when only a limited number of parcels are available; 
the good is perishable and limited; the potential number of beneficiaries (if selected by their 
need or income level) is incommensurate? Rather than an impossible administrative criterion 
that would prove impractical or an open political process that would risk triggering 
opposition and revolt, a discreet, opaque distribution of resources through existing locally 
based networks (here SANCO and the ANC) is certainly easier from a management 
perspective. At the same time, although non-members or opposition-aligned political party 
groups can challenge such decisions, it is also an informal rule that is understood and de 
facto accepted by most local residents. 
 
Moreover, decentralization and participation share with clientelist logics two main features. 
First, they entail an increased personalisation of the relationship between the State and its 
citizens – far from a Weberian ideal – and in particular between local representatives and 
their voters. Elected local representatives are supposed to be ‘closer’ to their constituency as 
constituencies are narrower and more ‘local’. This is so not only during election times, but 
also between election times as an effect of participation – with elected representatives 
supposedly ‘accessible’ to solve everyday problems and concerns of their voters, on a 
flexible and ad hoc basis. Second, participation and decentralization on the one hand, 
clientelism on the other, also imply a form of local negotiability and adaptability of public 
policies. In this they follow the principles of ‘good governance’ largely adopted by important 
cities around the world, which broadly state that policies should be the result of negotiation 
between different levels of government (decentralization, where the local level is supposedly 
the better informed about local needs and contexts) and between the State and ‘local’ civil 
society (participation – in a broad understanding of local civil society including for instance 
local business groups or business groups with a stake in an area). This spatial (but also 
temporal) flexibility, according to local contexts and circumstances, departs from a universal, 
abstract, city, region or nation-wide set of laws and rules, opening the way for local 
arrangements, or ‘negotiated local compromises’.10 
 
Personalisation of relationships between politicians and voters on the one hand, flexibility of 
the law or policy to be adapted and negotiated at the local level on the other, are at the core 
of clientelist practices. Possibly they both foster a form of greater accountability (in the sense 
of responsiveness), and a form of opacity of public policies and choices that would tend to 
lower accountability (in the sense of transparency and questionability). Following this 
perspective, returning to Story One, one could argue that tasking a civic organisation 
(SANCO) with the selection of beneficiaries for state-provided food parcels is following 
some of the principles of decentralization, i.e. finding a way to gather information that is the 
most locally accurate in order to be able to better focus public policies and distribute scarce 
public resources to the most needy. It could argued that it follows principles of participation, 
with the civic organization having a say and a control over resource allocation. Some would 
argue clientelism is a mere perversion of this practice, even perhaps a double perversion, 
combining a lack of representativity of the civic (not encompassing all needy residents) with 
the probable dishonesty of its leadership. They would argue that this approach might have 
worked if the civic organization had been a ‘good one’, disentangled from any partisan 
affiliation and immune to any monetary temptation, a naïve interpretation. The devolution of 
powers of allocation of public resources to an agent that is not democratically accountable is 
in itself conducive to undemocratic practices,
11
 whatever the local legitimacy of this agent. 
Personalisation and opacity of the access to public goods are the rule, and do by definition 
create space for possible abuse.  
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Ambiguities of decentralization-participation-clientelism 
The impact of decentralized and participatory governance modes on democratic 
accountability is far from obvious, although both claim to enhance accountability and local 
democracy by rendering local representatives and the state more accessible and more 
responsive to local needs. The theoretical and practical fine line between those two notions 
and that of clientelism highlights their ‘dark side’, stressing the potential opacity and 
arbitrariness of public policies that tend to weaken State accountability to citizens. It also 
underlines the possible bright side of clientelism, which is conducive to forms of 
accountability, despite its real democratic shortcomings.  
 
Here, the distinction between individual and collective clientelism (as expressed for instance 
in Gay 1999) is crucial. Story One illustrates a case of individual clientelism, with the 
distribution by SANCO of food parcels to selected individuals, loyal members of the 
organization, as both a reward for their membership and support, and as a consolidation of 
such support. But it is also a case of collective clientelism, between the (ANC-led) local 
municipality and the (ANC-aligned) residents’ association, SANCO: the alliance is 
consolidated and confirmed by the attribution of a collective good to an organization in 
exchange for it building collective support for the ANC. Using SANCO to distribute food 
parcels allows the municipality to highlight ANC-led delivery, rather than delegate this task 
to the DA councillor, more broadly reflecting a high-level party-political competition. 
 
Story Two is purely a case of collective clientelism, where individuals join their voices 
within a group to fight a public policy, and later to support the party that has granted them a 
favour after concluding a local bargain. Here, it is the possibility for the group to remain in 
the area and to avoid having their houses demolished that is at stake, even if the goods 
distributed are individual dwellings. The point here is that collective clientelism provides for 
a form of public accountability: the State and the party are finally obliged to take into 
consideration local residents’ claims, rather than simply ignore them. For Gay (1998), 
collective clientelism is the dominant form of state accountability to the poor, as he argues 
that the rhetoric of rights seldom reaches them due to the scarcity of public resources and 
inefficiencies of the State, in the context of Brazilian cities. Clientelism therefore becomes a 
singular (albeit restricted) means through which the voices of the poor are heard and 
translated into some form of benefit and access to public goods, collective clientelism leading 
to the public delivery of collective or at least public goods (such as the electrification of an 
area or tarring of roads). 
 
This reflection on clientelism also shows how other forms of accountability are undermined 
by personalized and flexible public practices of allocation of public goods to local 
beneficiaries; and, in the same ways, how decentralization and participation also can lead to 
diminished accountability. This argument resonates with well-developed arguments of the 
‘local trap’ (Purcell 2006), of ‘the dangers of localism’ (Mohan and Stokke 2000), and Cooke 
and Kothari’s (2001) point that the confinement of debates on local and immediate issues 
legitimizes the broader status quo, since some issues cannot be challenged at the that scale. A 
focus on clientilism further develops these arguments, taking into account the micro-politics 
at work in clientelist (but also in decentralized and participatory) practices, which tend to 
focus on the everyday workings of the state (Fuller and Bénéï 2001; Corbridge et al 2005). 
 
Returning to Story Two, there are several sides to be exposed. It can be seen as a victory for 
residents of the seventeen houses – they obtained what they wanted through a negotiated 
process with the City, thanks to the threat of legal action gained through CALS’ intervention. 
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Local residents were able to mobilize for their best immediate advantage with the political 
resources they had (through linkages to the NGO as well as to the ANC), alternatively using 
threat, conflict, cooperation and compromise. The result is a success, both practical (no 
eviction) and political (links with the ANC have been maintained and possibly reinforced), 
even though the links with CALS have been sacrificed. It can be seen as a successful form of 
participation. However, this success can also be seen as a setback for the broader local 
community affected by urban renewal and eviction threats, and for CALS, which hoped to 
see and support the emergence of a broader residents’ movement fighting evictions in the 
whole area. CALS’ dismissal by residents, who are quite powerful local leaders, does not 
make future action easy for the legal NGO, at least not at a collective or public scale. The 
City, on the other hand, has managed to limit the political impact of this victory, in a context 
where more evictions are taking place, publicly and privately led, in a slow but steady move 
towards urban regeneration, at the expense of often less organised and less politically-
resourced groups of residents. Their final acceptance of residents’ claims to stay in their area 
has not been the result of a public debate and the affirmation of a right of residents to have a 
say on their neighbourhood; rather, it has been negotiated behind closed doors as a favour, 
due to exceptional circumstances and for the benefit of a specific set of former political 
activists. In other words, collective clientelism in the language of favour and political loyalty 
has destroyed the possibility of social movement mobilization in the language of rights and 
legal confrontation with the state. 
 
More generally, local negotiations and immediate advantages, be they collective ones (like in 
Story Two) or, more frequently, individual ones (as in Story One), lead to the fragmentation 
of more radical contestations and the sedation of more critical social movements. Whilst we 
agree with some authors (Auyero et al 2009) that clientelism and collective mobilization are 
not always contradictory and often rely on the same social and political networks, and that 
patrons sometimes have an interest in triggering collective movements of contention in a 
dominant party system such as South Africa’s, most clientelistic networks seem to work 
towards maintaining the status quo (at least when it comes to challenging government and its 
policies) and the muting of more radical contentious movements. 
 
How can we understand the paradox that decentralization, participation and clientelism 
simultaneously seem to increase and decrease state accountability to urban citizens? Story 
One shows a pragmatic way of distributing scarce minor public goods to local residents, 
through a (clientelistic, decentralized, participatory) discrete and more or less locally 
accepted way. It provided access to public goods to some low-income residents; but did not 
allow for claims to be built publicly or collectively about the nature, quantity and distribution 
modalities of the public goods granted. Story Two led to a victory for low-income residents 
who, initially confronted with an impossible threat, managed to resist a powerful World-Cup 
led drive for urban regeneration, thanks to personal political and social networks of local 
leaders. The State granted the request, but it also undermined the possibility for broader 
policy change. 
 
Certainly at a theoretical level, one needs to unpack in this paradox the notion of 
accountability, often taken for granted and under-theorized. Schedler (1999) distinguishes 
between two dimensions of accountability: ‘answerability’ of the power-holders (to provide 
information and to provide justification for their action) and their sanctionability (risk of 
being removed from office if they fail to deliver or to answer). Both are central to the debate 
on decentralization and participation, supposedly promoting a better responsiveness to 
citizens’ needs; and, both are, more broadly, relevant to the debate on substantive democracy 
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(Harriss et al 2004). An alternative and operational definition of accountability at the local 
state level could differentiate between two dimensions: the first measuring the State’s 
reactivity and responsiveness to specific contexts; and the second concerned about 
transparency and the possibility for citizens to question local policies and practices. This 
would explain why decentralization, participation and actually, clientelism, can be 
simultaneously said to enhance one dimension of accountability, responsiveness or reactivity, 
at least for those residents who are politically resourced and connected; and to undermine 
another, transparency or questionability. Although the dichotomy is quite simplistic, the first 
dimension puts a stress on governance efficiency; the second is more of a democratic and 
political concern. 
 
Conclusion: Debates on African cities’ governance 
Existing literature on local democracy in African cities stresses four key characteristics that 
mark urban governance: first, the importance of personal networks as major means of 
survival for the poor (Swilling 1997; Tostensen et al 2001; Simone 2004); second, the 
multiplicity of levels of leaderships and group affiliations, of varying nature and with 
different, often competing, types of legitimacies (from traditional chiefs to local party 
representative, for instance) (Rakodi 2002; Simone 2004; Akinyele 2006); third, the fluidity 
and ephemeral character of urban governance and power patterns (Simone 2004; Lindell 
2008) that render northern concepts such as ‘urban regimes’ or ‘growth coalitions’ unsuitable 
to describe much more flexible African urban realities; and fourth, the lack of independence 
of civil society organizations towards political parties and their embeddedness in clientelistic 
relationships with the State at all levels, said to compromise their ability to challenge the 
State and work towards the consolidation of democracy or the empowerment of the poor 
(Tostensen et al 2001; Rakodi 2002; Watson 2002). It is useful to bring these quite specific 
characteristics of African urban governance into conversation with our reflection on 
decentralization, participation and clientelism. 
 
Decentralization adds another layer of political legitimacy and of leadership – that of the 
local councillor – to those already existing; participation provides another arena for 
interaction, negotiation and access to urban goods – in particular around urban projects, more 
or less empowering and more or less influenced by international institutions’ demands. This 
reinforces the first two characteristics of urban governance in African cities outlined above: 
decentralization and participation do empower local residents by broadening the limited 
range of existing opportunities to voice their needs and access public goods - not necessarily 
on a radically different model from previous opportunities and channels (as these political 
opportunities still rely on direct and personalized linkages between client and patron), but at 
least offering an additional option.  
 
However, as illustrated in this paper
12
, decentralization and participation can also easily 
increase the fragmentation of broader social movements as well as promote the sedation of 
more radical claims for political or structural changes of resource allocation, particularly as 
their independence from party politics is further compromised. These dynamics affirm the 
social and economic status quo, where the weaker (in terms of economic as well as political 
resources) are further marginalized and the politically networked manage to maintain their 
own position and possibly rise on the political or economic ladder, without challenging the 
existing power structure. In this sense, our paper contradicts the third characteristic outlined 
above. The idea of fluidity and instability of power patterns in African urban governance is 
problematic in that it discards the notion of reproduction of unequal power structures, and 
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denies the possibility of the overall stability of political leaders or patrons. They may remain 
in power even when their power platform, legitimation discourse and types of alliances 
change according to political and economic opportunity – giving an impression of fluidity, 
while in real terms nothing changes. 
 
Third, decentralization and participation dynamics are likely to reinforce the importance of 
the role of political parties in civil society. Indeed, they aim at least rhetorically to strengthen 
the power of civil society organizations in urban governance, which therefore become more 
important a stake for political parties’ competition at the local level. Evidence on the current 
growing importance of party politics in South African civil society (Friedman 2010) tends to 
confirm this hypothesis; we argue elsewhere (Benit-Gbaffou, forthcoming) that party 
structures are also more prominent as means for the poor to access the State, because local 
government participatory structures do not fulfil their promises, and the ANC-dominated 
party system does not allow for State accountability either in the absence of real party 
competition. This growth of party influence in civil society, directly or indirectly triggered by 
decentralization and participation reforms of local government, tends to reinforce the fourth 
characteristic, a civil society strongly dependent on parties and the State. However, as argued 
here, the link between civil society and political parties is ambiguous. It is not always 
disempowering for residents because it provides another modality or channel of access to the 
state for low-income residents.  
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